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This paper analyzes awards as a means of motivation prevalent in the scientific community, 
but so far neglected in the economic literature on incentives, and discusses their relationship 
to monetary compensation. Awards are better suited than performance pay to reward scientific 
tasks, which are typically of a vague nature. They derive their value, for instance, from 
signaling research talent to outsiders. Awards should therefore be taken seriously as a means 
of motivating research that may complement, or even substitute for, monetary incentives. 
While we discuss awards in the context of academia, our conclusions apply to other principal-
agent settings as well. 
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I.  Money and Awards 
Did Albert Einstein earn good money? Was Immanuel Kant rich? How financially successful 
was Newton? Most people would probably consider these questions inappropriate or even 
offensive. They take it for granted that these geniuses were motivated by a quest for truth and 
not by a craving for monetary gain. They would – at best – admit that the geniuses had to 
support themselves materially, and provide a decent standard of living for themselves and their 
families. It is intriguing to question the extent to which successful academics are motivated by 
monetary gain. The question is of immediate policy relevance, as there is a strong movement 
to extend pay-for-performance programs beyond for-profit firms to not-for-profit firms and, in 
particular, to academia. An extreme example is the Vienna University of Economics and 
Business Administration, which pays € 1000 for a paper published in an 'A journal' and € 3000 
for a paper published in an 'A+ journal'.1 At most universities, pay-for-performance is applied in 
a less rigid way, but salaries are still increasingly linked to the researcher’s publication,  citation 
record, and successfully securing outside research funding. 
At the same time, a second development can be observed in academia; namely, an explosion 
of awards. In addition to the time-honored titles doctor honoris causa or academic senator, 
universities, academies and professional societies hand out a large number of awards, honors, 
and prizes, ranging from a multitude of “best paper awards” to the highly esteemed Nobel 
Prizes. Using the revealed preference approach, these facts suggest that academics are very 
fond of awards. Good examples are Milton Friedman and Gary Becker, with the long list of 
awards they themselves indicate in the honors and awards section of Who’s Who in Economics 
(Blaug and Vane, 2003). They list no less than 50 and 26 awards, respectively.  
These two developments, the rising prevalence of pay-for-performance programs and the 
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increasing use of awards, occur simultaneously and independently of each other. The 
adherents of pay-for-performance as an instrument to promote research implicitly suggest that 
money is the major, if not the only, incentive to induce scholars to do plenty of good research. 
The adherents of awards as incentives tend to assume that recognition – for example, through 
receiving awards – is a more important source of motivation. An effort is made not to “pollute” 
an award by mentioning the money that goes with it.  
This paper presents a first attempt at analyzing awards as a major means of motivating 
researchers in academia. Monetary compensation and awards are compared as instruments 
providing incentives for scientific research. We assume that utility depends positively, and with 
decreasing marginal effects, on income and on social recognition, as well as on intrinsic 
motivation, i.e. the enjoyment of the research activity per se. While the exact specification of 
the utility function is not important for our purposes, it is central that all three factors enter the 
utility function directly.  
Before we get involved in the analysis, it is worth highlighting two caveats that complicate the 
analysis. First, in academia there is more than one single clear-cut principal-agent relationship 
relevant for setting incentives. There is a close principal-agent relationship between a university 
(represented by the department chair, dean, rector or president) and its scholars as employees. 
There is a similar, but less close relationship between academies, foundations, or professional 
societies and the scholars in their respective disciplines. The latter also set incentives, for 
instance, in the form of awards or honorary fellowships. Second, there is considerable 
interdependence and simultaneity between awards and monetary compensation that 
complicate the discussion of either instrument in isolation. For example, income depends 
positively on research success directly, because of variable salary components, and indirectly, 
because successful researchers can attract higher amounts of external funding. At the same 
time, income may also rise due to the receipt of an award. Awards in turn increase income,   4 
directly and indirectly. They directly increase income when they come with a monetary bonus. 
They indirectly increase income when they help to build up a reputation, make the person’s 
research known to a wider audience, and facilitate access to external funding. The positive 
income effects of awards are often caused by the capacity of awards to signal otherwise hard-
to-assess qualities of a researcher to outsiders. Social recognition, on the other hand, may be 
generated by good research and by receiving awards. At the same time, receiving money for 
research may, under certain circumstances, also provide social recognition similar to receiving 
an award. This is, for instance, implicit in the expression “to be awarded money”. The 
preceding two points make clear that the differences between monetary compensation and 
awards are far from simple and clear-cut. However, we still consider a comparison of the two 
instruments valuable, as trade-offs and decisions on their respective usage have to be made 
when setting incentives for researchers.  
In the first part of this paper, we discuss monetary compensation and awards in their purest 
form, i.e. monetary compensation deprived of any social recognition, and awards with no direct 
or indirect material benefits, highlighting the conditions that drive the effectiveness of both 
instruments. Section II deals with the extent of applicability of the two instruments, which 
depend on external constraints to their use. These constraints are ideology (section II.1), 
feasibility (section II.2), control over the instruments (section II.3), and the required level of 
performance measurement (section II.4). Section III then discusses the effectiveness of the two 
incentives by comparing the size of their marginal benefits (section III.1), the value to the 
recipients (III.2), the instruments’ signaling capacity (III.3), their effects on intrinsic motivation 
(III.4), and their effects on the creation of loyalty (III.5). In Section IV, the major strengths and 
weaknesses of the two instruments are discussed and it is argued that an effective incentive 
system must combine them in a way that exploits the comparative advantages of each 
instrument, while minimizing the effect of the respective disadvantages. Finally, Section V   5 
concludes.  
Our knowledge about the comparative effectiveness of money and awards as incentives is 
severely limited, especially with regard to awards. There is almost no serious empirical 
evidence on the effects of awards on (research) performance, mainly because the properties 
and effects of awards have rarely been studied by economists or by other social scientists.2 In 
view of this large gap in knowledge, it is unwarranted to simply take money as the best and 
only effective motivator for scientific achievement, as was implicitly done in the recent 
installment of pay-for-performance programs in academia. The study of awards, and their 
impact on performance, is a wide-open area for meaningful research. 
In the remaining part of the paper, the following conclusions will be derived and supported by 
empirical evidence: 
-  Monetary incentives are not  the only viable and effective instrument to induce 
successful research. Awards should also be considered as a means to further research 
performance.  
-  Monetary incentives applied to research not only have the well-known positive 
incentive effects, but may also exhibit some severe disadvantages, such as when they 
crowd out the intrinsic motivation to do interesting and path-breaking research. This 
effect is related to the findings of Amabile (1996, 1998), who shows that extrinsic 
rewards decrease creativity. Further, the application of performance-pay programs is 
often restricted by bureaucratic rules and by difficulties in measuring research 
                                                 
2   Exceptions are the theoretical analyses of Gavrila, Caulkins, Feichtinger, Tragler, and Hartl 
(2005), Besley and Ghatak (2008), Frey (2005, 2006, 2007), and Frey and Neckermann (2008), as well 
as the empirical studies Neckermann and Frey (2007), Neckermann and Kosfeld (2008), and 
Neckermann, Cueni, and Frey (2008). Precursors are Hansen and Weisbrod (1972).   6 
performance adequately. This does not mean that monetary incentives never work. 
However, several factors characteristic for the academic setting make it less likely that 
performance pay has the desired impact. Essential features of the academic 
environment are the substantial amount of autonomy, multi-tasking, creativity, and 
immeasurable outputs. In such a setting, incentive pay may be considered 
inappropriate, or may even be counterproductive, as it leads to strategic behavior and 
tends to undermine intrinsic research motivation. When discussing the effectiveness of 
incentives, it is therefore essential to consider the conditions under which they are 
applied.   
-  Awards have certain features that render them attractive in the academic setting. 
Award givers can subjectively evaluate overall performance ex post, as long as this is 
done in a transparent and fair way. Hence, awards are better suited than money to 
reward vague tasks, because the criteria for monetary compensation almost always 
have to be specified clearly in advance. Further, awards motivate scholars – due to 
their value in signaling research talent and motivation – characteristics that are 
important in academics, but which are typically hard to assess for outsiders. Hence, 
awards may play important roles in the career of academics. Further, awards are 
valued because they convey appreciation and recognition on the part of colleagues 
and the public. They may thereby raise intrinsic motivation to do research and 
generate loyalty to the awarding institution. 
-  A combination of money and awards may sometimes help to overcome the 
disadvantages of either instrument used in isolation. However, there are limits to 
combining the two instruments, mainly because awards lose many of their unique 
features when the monetary component becomes too salient.  
   7 
II.  The Applicability of Money and Awards 
In order to highlight the characteristics of money and awards, this section and the next section 
consider the two incentive instruments in their “pure” forms, i.e. monetary incentives that do not 
generate any social recognition, and awards without any impact on current or future material 
well-being. In the following, the external constraints on the applicability of the two instruments 
are discussed. The characteristics of monetary inducements are a well-known part of standard 
economics and are therefore only mentioned briefly.  
 
1.  Ideological Restrictions 
In most current democratic market economies, both money and awards are politically 
acceptable instruments and can be used freely. The situation is quite different in communist 
and socialist countries, where the use of performance bonuses is often suppressed. Even in 
democratic countries, there is an old tradition, going back to Leibnitz, claiming that monetary 
incentives for research are socially  undesirable. Academia is taken to be a ”Republic of 
Science”, with its own values and rules inconsistent with an economic market (Polanyi, 1962; 
Merton, 1973). Recently, the ideological system in academia has been changing and pay-for-
performance programs have been increasingly accepted.  
 
2.  Feasibility 
Using money as an incentive is severely restricted when academic institutions are short of 
funds. This has often been the case in the past, and is still true in many regions of the world 
(for instance, in Africa, South America and Southern Europe). Limited funds constitute a severe 
restriction. Field experiments have demonstrated that one should “pay enough or not pay at all” 
(see Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000), as the payment of low amounts might lead to worse   8 
outcomes than setting no incentives at all. Awards, in contrast, are less costly and are therefore 
widely used by fund-restricted institutions, such as NGOs, academies and professional 
organizations. The award itself typically costs little in terms of the material used. Some costs 
arise from the award ceremony, and from the selection and screening process necessary when 
selecting the recipients. In the case of academia, these costs are typically low: awards mostly 
consist of a certificate, and screening costs are moderate as the set of potential recipients is 
often limited and committee members have some idea about the merit of each scientist in the 
respective community. Further, research institutions derive additional benefits from awards, as 
they can use the occasion to publicize their existence and activities. The traditional “dies 
academicus” or degree-day has always been understood in this way.  
 
3.  Extent of Control over the Instruments 
The scope for handing out money may be restricted by public rules limiting the amount of 
money to be spent, or prohibiting pay differentiation among researchers, who are public sector 
employees in many countries. In contrast, public and private institutions have full control over 
awards. Those dissatisfied with not getting an award cannot turn to a court. Indeed, state 
orders are one of the few areas not subject to legal scrutiny. 
 
4.  Performance Measurement  
Pay-for-performance programs are based on the notion that performance can be accurately 
measured, so that the amount of the bonus can be calculated. If performance measures are 
noisy, much of the incentive effect is lost. If an academic feels that the exact amount of a 
monetary reward does not correspond to his or her research achievement, he or she is 
disappointed and his or her motivation for research may falter. As many performance   9 
dimensions of academics are immeasurable, or can only be measured partially, specifying 
criteria for performance-pay may lead to the well-known multi-tasking problem, i.e. a distortion 
of behavior concerning those aspects of the job that are relevant for the bonus. It is well known 
that research performance is difficult to assess. When looking at the publication record of an 
academic, the performance measured, for instance, greatly depends on the particular approach 
(see Frey and Rost, 2008, or the recent analysis by the International Mathematical Union as 
reported by Adler, Ewing and Taylor, 2008). As a consequence, an effective application of pay-
for-performance programs to research is difficult. 
In contrast, awards do not require an exact evaluation of performance. It suffices that it is 
approximately known what the overall performance is, because the award itself provides 
general recognition rather than recognition counted in exact sums of Dollars or Euros 
(examples are “Teaching Awards” or “Best Paper Prizes”). An award may even be given for 
“Lifetime Performance”,3 which is a rather vague, but still valuable concept. Theoretically, many 
monetary bonuses are also subjectively determined ex post. However, monetary payments are 
subject to a much stricter set of rules, and employees may even sue employers in the cases 
when they disagree with the stipulated amount. Therefore, most bonuses are determined 
according to a clear and transparent set of quantifiable performance measures.  
 
III.  Effectiveness of Money and Awards as Incentive Instruments 
This section compares five ways in which the two instruments, money and awards, differ in 
                                                 
3   One example is the Nobel Prize, which – at least in economics – is often awarded for lifetime 
performance, rather than for a specific piece of work. This practice is followed, despite the fact that 
Nobel explicitly stated in his last will that the income should be "distributed annually in the form of prizes 
to those who during the preceding year have conferred the greatest benefit on mankind."    10
their effectiveness in incentivizing research.  
 
1.  Marginal Effect 
Recent empirical research on happiness (a reasonably good proxy for utility) has shown that 
the marginal utility of money is, indeed, decreasing exactly in the way postulated by standard 
economic theory. An increase in income raises the happiness of poor people considerably, 
while the effect on people with higher income is relatively small.4 There is no evidence on how 
the marginal benefit of awards changes with the number of awards received. However, there 
are some models on status incentives (e.g. Auriol and Renault, 2004) that assume decreasing 
marginal benefits and a positive cross-elasticity between income and status. It seems plausible 
to make the same assumptions for awards. In order to determine whether to give money or an 
award to a particular person, what matters, in our context, is whether the marginal utility of 
money or awards is decreasing more quickly. If you take the expression “you can never have 
enough”, there are some who believe you can never have enough money. Then there are 
others who believe you can never have enough recognition, and that the marginal utility gained 
by receiving more and more awards remains high. Thus the issue must remain open.  
There is another effect to be considered, namely the induced change in utility over time. 
According to the (extreme version of the) “Easterlin Paradox” (Easterlin, 1974, 2003), an 
increase in income first raises utility, but then this increase wears off over time. After a year, 
between two thirds and three quarters of the utility increase has evaporated (Frey and Stutzer, 
2006). Over time, this results in an increase in the per capita income of a country being 
accompanied by a (nearly) constant happiness level. Again, there is no evidence for awards. 
However, one may once more draw on the literature on status, which has shown that people 
                                                 
4   See Frey and Stutzer (2002a, 2002b), Layard (2005), Deaton (2007), and Frey (2008).   11
are much slower to adapt to higher status than to higher income (Di Tella, Rafael, and Robert 
MacCulloch, 2006). Therefore, an increase in status leads to a more sustained increase in 
utility than income does. 
 
2. Value to the Recipient       
Money is of great value to the recipient because it is the most fungible of all goods, an insight 
long since central to economic thinking.5 The transfer of money to the recipient is also a clear 
and credible signal of appreciation and recognition, as money is a scarce resource.  
In contrast, awards mainly consist of a “piece of ribbon” or a paper certificate of no significant 
material value. Therefore, there is no apparent constraint when it comes to handing out 
awards. This can easily result in an award inflation, as has indeed happened in some countries 
(examples being the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic), where so many 
orders, medals, and decorations were handed out that they lost much of their value. As the 
value of an award critically depends on its scarcity, the giver must resort to some credible self-
binding mechanism if he wants to maintain its value. One such mechanism is to combine the 
award with money. This is an effective constraint as funds are limited. A second mechanism is 
a formal restriction, e.g. in the statutes of the association, of the number of awards handed out. 
Such a restriction can take various forms. One can either restrict the number of awards by 
having a fixed number in circulation. This procedure holds, for example, for some state orders 
such as the Most Noble Order of the Garter or the Most Ancient and Noble Order of the Thistle, 
which are limited to 25 and 16 bearers, respectively. Another possibility is to hand out awards 
only at fixed intervals and only to a fixed number of persons. That is the case for the John 
Bates Clark Medal, which is bestowed on one person every two years. Binding oneself by 
                                                 
5   See e.g. the comparison with gifts (Waldfogel, 1993).    12
restricting the number of possible recipients does not always work, because the award giving 
institution has a short-term incentive to increase the number receiving the award at the 
expense of the award’s reputation and value in the future. This is the case with the French 
“Légion d’honneur”, which is often given to academics. The number of recipients is strictly 
limited (1,250 Commanders and 10,000 Officers), but has been awarded to many more  (3,626 
Commanders and 22,401 Officers; see Frey, 2005). In academia, restrictions in the number of 
awards are often implicit and known by custom. It is, for example, generally known that good 
universities give out honorary doctorates to only one or, at most, two people per faculty per 
year.  
Another aspect concerning the value to the recipient is that the value of monetary incentives is 
unambiguous – provided there is no rampant inflation. Hence, it is exogenous to both the 
award-giving institution and the recipient. In contrast, the value of the award is endogenous and 
depends on many factors, such as its scarcity, which can be controlled by the giver, and the 
prestige of the award-giving institution, which can partly be influenced by the recipient. This 
may provide additional incentives to the recipient of an award, as he or she can increase the 
value of the received honor with his or her research success, which in turn raises the prestige 
and reputation of the award-giving institution.  
 
3.  Signaling Capacity 
In general, academic talent and research success are hard for outsiders to observe. Outsiders 
can assess the quality of research by reading the researcher’s publications, thereby inferring 
his or her talent. However, doing so requires a substantial amount of investment in terms of 
time and knowledge. Therefore, signals of quality and ability are greatly esteemed in the 
academic setting. In general, monetary compensation is not publicized. Receiving a bonus for   13
research success helps little, if at all, in signaling this information to outsiders. The contrast to 
awards is striking. An award is always given at a public ceremony and it is always clearly 
specified and publicized why the person has earned it. The “laudatio” which is normally given at 
a solemn celebration, such as the “dies academicus”, plays a large role. Hence, a clear signal 
is given to both insiders and outsiders. The signaling value of an award is increased when it is 
publicly known due to receiving wide media coverage. A prominent example is, of course, the 
Nobel Prize, which turns some scholars into celebrities.  
There is a second dimension to signaling, namely self-signaling or self-image concerns. 
Bénabou and Tirole (2003) lay out a framework, suggesting that individuals typically do not 
remember their own motivations accurately. Therefore, they infer this information from their 
behavior and the outcome of their behavior. When individuals are given money for their 
research success, they may infer from this that they engaged in the research activity mainly to 
earn money and not  because they were interested in or fascinated by the subject. This may 
then result in a decrease of intrinsic motivation. Awards are less powerful extrinsic motivators, 
so this should not happen, or to a lesser extent, with awards. Specifically, because the intrinsic 
motivation and endurance of a researcher is often emphasized in the “laudatio”, intrinsic 
motivation may even be fostered.  
 
4.  Crowding-out Effects on Intrinsic Motivation 
Intrinsic motivation has been found to be crucial for successful and original research (Amabile, 
1996, 1998). In addition to the signaling aspect discussed above, outside interference in the 
form of money can crowd out the intrinsic motivation to do innovative research due to the 
psychological substitution mechanism (Frey, 1997). The crowding-out effect has been 
supported by considerable empirical evidence (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a; for a survey, see   14
Frey and Jegen, 2001). The crowding-out effect is partly caused by the fact that performance 
bonuses often make strict monitoring necessary, so that this intervention is perceived as 
controlling rather than supportive. Awards, on the other hand, can do without strict performance 
measurements, as they only require a broad assessment of performance. Hence, awards are 
probably less likely to be perceived as controlling. However, it is, of course, true that rightly 
administered pay-for-performance programs may avoid crowding out intrinsic motivation, just 
as badly administered award systems may well promote it.  
 
5.  Creation of Loyalty to the Giver 
Experimental research suggests that “[…] money brings about a self-sufficient orientation in 
which people prefer to be free of dependency and dependents […]” (Vohs, Mead and Goode, 
2006: 1154). According to this study, recipients of money tend to isolate themselves and to feel 
less obliged towards the institution responsible for the payment. The gesture of payment 
relegates the relationship to the purely economic sphere, in which characteristics, such as 
loyalty, play no role (see also Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000b). 
In contrast, an award, once accepted, creates loyalty. A good example is the movie “The 
Kingdom of Heaven” by Ridley Scott, which tells about the fall of the Crusaders' kingdom. 
When the final assault is about to begin, the hero and chief organizer of the defense asks all 
the men ready to fight to kneel down and be knighted, as he is convinced that knighting the 
men turns them into better fighters (Scott, 2005).6 This may create a feeling of commitment, 
because public recognition of the recipient on the part of the giver generates an emotional 
bond and because the award connects the winner with the institution. The recipient would 
devalue his or her own award if he or she were to downgrade the giver. A bond of loyalty is 
                                                 
6   We owe this example to Hillel Rapoport.   15
therefore established between the giver and the recipient. While the strength of this bond 
varies, depending on the prize and the recipient, it is most likely stronger for awards than for 
monetary payments.   
 
IV. Policy Options 
The discussion reveals that money and awards differ substantially as incentive instruments in 
many ways. The main strengths of money as an incentive are its fungibility (consumption 
value), and the fact that it more easily serves as a credible signal of appreciation (Dur, 2008). 
Its main weaknesses are the often limited applicability, due to political, social, and economic 
restrictions, and the problems entailed in the necessary performance measurement. The main 
strengths of awards are their wide applicability (due to their discretionary nature), and their 
effectiveness, (due to their clear signaling capacity), motivation crowding-in, and the creation of 
loyalty. The main weakness of awards is the difficulty of the award-givers to commit themselves 
to keeping the number of awards scarce and therefore valuable. Further, the discretionary 
nature of awards implies that they are only taken seriously if there is considerable trust in the 
selection procedure. 
Although money may, in principle, bring recognition and status, awards are more effective. This 
is due to the fact that monetary compensation is typically not publicized, and knowledge on 
differences in pay restricted to few, if any, close colleagues.  
It follows that money is a valuable instrument to support scientific research if the price system 
is politically and socially accepted, if the research performance desired is well specified, if 
incomes are low (and the marginal utility of money high), if there is little need for signaling, and 
if the research output does not depend greatly on intrinsic motivation, which is often the case 
when routine rather than pathbreaking research is needed. Awards are the preferred   16
instruments if extraordinary research is to be furthered (the characteristics of which cannot be 
determined ex ante), if performance measurement is difficult, and if there is a need for a 
substantial amount of intrinsic motivation. Awards are preferable if signaling and a bond of 
loyalty are considered important. 
It might seem obvious that the advantages of each instrument could be maximized and the 
disadvantages minimized by combining money and awards in a suitable way. This is done in 
many cases. Thus, for example, the Nobel Prize includes a considerable sum of money. 
However, one might well argue that connecting a prize with a substantial monetary bonus is a 
good strategy for a newly established prize to signal the seriousness of the intention to honor 
good research, and to make it prominent (prizes with higher monetary amounts may receive 
more press coverage and may be known by more people). As for the Nobel Prize, this might 
imply that the monetary component is in fact no longer needed and adds neither to the publicity 
of the award nor the incentive it provides. Indeed, the lobbying activities surrounding this prize 
suggest that many scholars would be prepared to pay a high monetary amount to receive it (as 
long as this were not revealed). But there are also examples of important awards in academia 
that are not associated with a monetary bonus, such as the John Bates Clark Medal of the 
American Economic Association, or honorary doctorates that do not come with money because 
their “seriousness”, and therefore value to the recipients, has been established by tradition and 
rules. 
The danger of combining money and awards is that both instruments lose their advantages and 
the disadvantages remain. As discussed above, many prizes do not even publicize the amount 
of money that goes with them, or publicly downplay the role of the compensation. As soon as 
the monetary component becomes too salient, awards may, like performance pay, lead to 
motivation crowding-out, destroy self-signaling, and in turn lead to envy and sabotage.  
There are certain conditions in which there is no trade-off because money and awards are   17
intrinsically linked. Even “pure” awards, without money attached, may have an indirect 
monetary effect by raising future income and, under some conditions, receiving money may 
bring social recognition, which is a more typical characteristic of awards. In most cases, it may 
well be that incentives involving money and awards cannot be separated. These deliberations 
make clear that careful consideration of the issues – such as the external circumstances, the 
kind of activity to be fostered, and the needs and wants of potential recipients of the prize – is 
necessary in order to decide whether money, an award, or a combination of both are the ideal 
incentive in a given situation. Many of the issues raised require careful empirical investigation.    
 
V. Conclusions 
The discussion reveals that our knowledge about the comparative efficiency of money and 
awards as incentive instruments is severely limited. While there is substantial knowledge about 
the functioning of money as an incentive, there is next to no serious empirical evidence on the 
effects of awards (see, for instance, the survey on incentives in firms by Prendergast, 1999). 
The properties and effects of awards have rarely been studied by economists or by other social 
scientists. In view of this large gap in knowledge, it is unwarranted to simply take money as the 
best and only effective motivator for scientific performance, as is implicitly done by the pay for 
performance programs recently applied in academia. The study of awards, and their 
performance compared to monetary incentives, is an area wide open for meaningful and 
fascinating research, and awards may well turn out to be a valuable and preferable incentive 
instrument in many circumstances in academia.     18
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